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demurrer was sustained to a count alleging that feme plaintiff was
being treated in her home by a physician about 2 a.m. when the elec-
tric current was cut off, so that the physician was unable to assist
her, to her damage, and that defendant could have notified her of
its intention to suspend the service by the exercise of reasonable care
and diligence.
PEYTON B. ABBoTr, JR.
Torts-Negligence-Proximate Cause
The plaintiff, an engineer on the defendant's railway, was scalded
by a steam plug being blown from the engine boiler and was forced
to jump from his cab. He landed between the rails of an adjacent
track, suffering a broken leg and other severe injuries. While thus
incapacitated, and before aid could reach him, he was further terri-
fied by the approach of an engine upon the track on which he lay.
Also, he heard other employees shouting "Stop 67 !", which increased
his fear of immediate death. The engine was stopped only a few
feet from the plaintiff. Plaintiff sued for damages because of phys-
ical injuries and nervous shock, and recovered on both counts. The
decision was affirmed.'
The unique feature of the case is that damages were allowed for
nervous shock which occurred subsequent to the physical injury. The
negligent omission, the physical injury, and the nervous shock, oc-
curred in sequence. In allowing a recovery for nervous shock, the
court treats it as proximately caused by the same negligence that
caused the physical injury, and said that each forms a part of the
natural and indivisible result.2 From the reported facts, it appears
that the real cause of the nervous shock was the approach of "67"
and the shouts of the spectators.
The decision of the case is to be recognized as an extension of the
recovery for nervous shock. There are yet states that require an
actual impact, causing a contemporaneous nervous injury, and a sub-
sequent physical injury, to permit a recovery for fright.3 Others
have recognized that such an impact, however slight, is a mere legal
peg4 upon which to hang a recovery when there is a nervous shock
'Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. McBride, 36 F. (2d) 841 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930).
'Supra note 1 at 842.
'Mitchell v. Rochester R. Co., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354, 34 L. R. A. 731
(1896) (Court is afraid of: (1) Fictitious and fraudulent litigation; (2) Dif-
ficulty of ascertaining damages; (3) Recovery against public policy). Spade
v. Lynn & Boston R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897).
'Throckmorton, Damages for Fright (1921) 34 H~av. L. REv. 260, 273.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
followed by a consequent physical illness.8 All allow a recovery when
nervous shock and physical injury happen together, and when each
aggravates the other.6 Few jurisdictions allow a recovery for mental
anguish alone. These recoveries are generally limited to the tele-
graph cases.7
The apparient weakness of the principal case is seen in the me-
chanical method utilized in reaching the decision. The doctrine of
"foreseeability," as a test of causal connection, has been limited8 and
critidsed9 in recent years. The jury, in determining negligence,
reviews and connects the known facts, and is not called upon to
"foresee" the unknown. It deals with "past actualities and not
future probabilities."10 Also, the question of recovery for nervous
shock should not be, "Was the negligent act too remote?" but, "Have
the courts extended the right of .recovery for fright to take in the
facts of this case?"11 It is submitted that the true test is whether
'Purcell v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034 (1892) ;
Mack v. South Bound R. Co., 52 S. C. 323, 29 S. E. 905 (1897); Kimberly v.
Howland, 143 N. C. 398, 404, 55 S. E .778 (1906) ("If the fright and nervous-
ness is the natural and direct result of the negligent act of the defendant, and
if the fright and nervousness directly cause an impairment of the health or
loss of power, then this -would constitute an injury .. .); Pankopf v. Hinkley,
141 Wis. 146, 123 N. W. 625, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1159 (1909).
The English rule is laid down in Ham-brook v. Stokes Bros. (1925) 1 K.
B. 141, 41 L. T. R. 125. According to D. Hughes Parry, Nervous Shock as a
Cause of Action in Tort (1925) 41 LQ. Rav. 297, the plaintiff may recover in
an action for damages for nervous shock suffered as the result of a wrongful
act by the defendant, -provided such shock -has caused physical injury to the
plaintiff as its direct, or contemplated, result. The "act" may assume forms:
physical impact; spoken words; or, conduct causing fright to the plaintiff.
E. F. Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts (1925),
10 CALI L. REv. 461, 487 et seq.
'Stutz v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 73 Wis. 147, 40 N. W. 653 (1888);
Warren v. Boston & Me. R. Co., 163 Mass. 484, 40 N. E. 895 (1895); Con-
solidated Trac. Co. v. Lambertson, 59 N. J. Law 297, 36 Atl. 100 (1896);
Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Roller, 100 Fed. 738, 49 L. R. A. 77 (C. C. A.
9th, 1900) ; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Nelson, 212 Fed. 69 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914);
Penn. R. Co. v. White, 242 Fed. 437 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917).
'A case comment in (1928-29) 3 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 285, discussing Gibbs
v. Western U. Teleg. Co., 196 N. C. 516, 146 S. E. 209 (1929) gives a list of
the states allowing a recovery for mental anguish caused by failure to deliver
death messages. These states are: Texas (1881); Tenn. (1888) ; Ala. (1890) ;
N. C. (1890) ; Iowa (1895) ; Kentucky (1900) ; Nevada (1904). Recovery is
denied in all the other states and in the Federal courts.
" Kimberly v. Howland, srupra note 5, at 402. Throckmorton, Damagest for
Fright (1921) 34 HARv. L. Rav. 260, 271.
'Albert Levitt, Proxiuate Cause and Legal Liability (1920) 90 CENT. L.
Ja. 188; GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE.
"Levitt, op. cit. supra note 9 at 194.
' Throckmorton, op. cit. supra note 8, at 268-272; D. Hughes Parry, op. cit.
supra, note 5.
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the negligence of the defendant was a substantial contributing factor
to the plaintiff's injury.12 The defendant's negligence in the prin-
cipal case set the stage for the totality of the plaintiff's injuries,
whether their occurrence was contemporaneous or consecutive.
JAMES A. WILLIAMS.
Levitt, op. cit. supra note 9, at p. 194 et seq.; Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co.
v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 24 L. ed. 256 (1896). This case sets up the "fore-
seeability" test, but bases its decision on the answer to the question, "Did the
facts constitute a continuous succession of events, so linked together as to
make a natural whole, or was there some new and independent cause inter-
vening between the wrong and the injury?" A consideration of the decision
of the case on the facts -will sustain the test advocated in this comment.
